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Abstract
We investigate theoretically and empirically how connections in evaluation
committees affect application decisions. Prospective candidates who are con-
nected to a committee member may be more likely to apply if they anticipate
a premium at the evaluation stage. However, when failure is costly and con-
nections convey information to potential applicants regarding their chances of
success, the impact of connections on application decisions is ambiguous. We
document the relevance of this information channel using data from national
evaluations in Italian academia. We find that prospective candidates are signifi-
cantly less likely to apply when the committee includes, through the luck of the
draw, a colleague, a coauthor or a Ph.D. advisor. At the same time, applicants
tend to receive more favorable evaluations from their connections. Overall, the
evidence suggests that connected individuals have access to better information
at the application stage, which helps them to make better application decisions.
Ignoring applicants’ self-selection would lead to an overestimation of the connec-
tion premium in evaluations by 29%.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that academic connections are important for a successful professional
career. They have a direct impact on researchers’ productivity (Azoulay, Graff Zivin
and Wang 2010, Azoulay, Fons-Rosen and Graff Zivin 2017, Mohnen 2017, Oettl 2012)
and they may help to receive better scientific evaluations. For instance, it has been
shown that the presence in a scientific committee of a coauthor, a colleague, an advisor
or a mentor helps to receive better evaluations in national qualification exams in France
(Combes, Linnemer and Visser 2008), in evaluations at the university level in Italy (De
Paola and Scoppa 2015, Durante, Labartino and Perotti 2011, Perotti 2002), in national
qualification exams in Spain (Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015) and in grant peer-review
in Sweden (Sandström and Hällsten 2008). In some cases, this connection premium
has been attributed to nepotism, while in other occasions, the higher success rate
of connected candidates may reflect the existence of information asymmetries about
applicants’ quality (e.g., Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015).
In this paper, we argue that beyond their direct impact on evaluations, connec-
tions in committees may also help researchers to make better application decisions.
Prospective candidates with ties to panel members are likely to have access to more
accurate information about their chances of success and this information may be useful
in contexts where applications are costly, including cases where there is an opportunity
cost. The way in which connected candidates may benefit from their informational
advantage depends on the magnitude of these application costs. When application
costs are relatively high, they may take advantage of opportunities that unconnected
(and uninformed) researchers would not dare to seek. Instead, when applications costs
are low (but positive), they are less likely to make the mistake of applying when their
chances of success are too slim.
We study empirically how connections affect application decisions using the evi-
dence provided by the Italian system of academic qualifications. Since 2012, in order
to be promoted to associate and full professor positions, researchers are required to
qualify first in a national evaluation conducted annually at the field level. Successful
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applicants can then apply for a position at the university level. Candidates who fail
to qualify have to wait for two years before they can apply again. Given the penaliza-
tion faced by unsuccessful applicants, researchers who anticipate that their chances of
success are slim may prefer to postpone their application until they have sufficiently
strengthened their curriculum.
This set up has several features which are convenient for our analysis. In the first
place, it is wide-ranging. Evaluations are conducted in every academic field and at
two different stages of the career ladder, associate and full professorships. Second,
committee members are randomly selected from a pool of eligible evaluators. This
provides a credible and transparent empirical strategy for identifying a causal impact
of committee composition on application behavior. Third, researchers need to pre-
register their application before the composition of the committee is known, allowing
us to observe a list of prospective candidates independently of whether they finally
apply or not. The opportunity cost of pre-registering was negligible and, therefore, the
list of prospective applicants helps us to focus on the group of individuals who revealed
to be interested in being considered for promotion. Finally, we observe the curriculum
vitae of all potential candidates and evaluators, as well as evaluators’ reports, in two
consecutive rounds of evaluations. We use this information to disentangle potential
mechanisms underlying the impact of connections on researchers’ application decisions.
Our database includes information on around 69,000 applications of researchers who
pre-registered in 2012 for the first round of the national qualification evaluation. Fol-
lowing the announcement of the identity of panel members, around 10,000 applications
were withdrawn. The remaining 59,000 applications were evaluated by a five-member
evaluation committee, and 40% managed to qualify. We study the role played by
three possible links between pre-registered candidates and eligible evaluators: prior
co-authorship of an academic article (coauthors), a common current affiliation (col-
leagues), and a advisor-advisee relationship. We find that the application rate is three
percentage points (p.p.) significantly lower among pre-registered researchers who, by
the luck of the draw, are assigned to a committee that includes a connection. The ef-
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fect is driven by connected researchers with a weak research profile. At the same time,
connected researchers tend to be more successful, both conditional and unconditional
on applying. Their success rate is 4.5 p.p. (13%) higher relative to other compara-
ble researchers pre-registered for the evaluation. Information from 300,000 individual
evaluations (five per applicant) also shows that, within each committee, connected can-
didates tend to receive more favorable evaluations from their connections, relative to
the assessments they receive from other committee members. This connection premium
is similar across individuals with different levels of research quality.
To interpret these findings, we propose a simple theoretical framework where (i)
evaluators may be biased in favor of (or against) connected applicants, (ii) evaluators
are better informed about their quality of connected applicants and (iii) applicants are
better informed about their chances of success when they have a connection in the
committee. In the context of Italian evaluations, this informational advantage on the
applicants’ side may have emerged either as a result of their ability to better observe the
preferences of their connections, or perhaps through private communications between
connected individuals and evaluators. In this framework, the existence of favoritism
in evaluations tends to increase the probability that connected individuals apply and
also their chances of success. However, information asymmetries have an ambiguous
effect. The availability of better information about the quality of connected individuals
may have a positive or negative impact on their application decisions and success rate,
depending on their ability and how competitive is the evaluation process. Similarly, the
informational advantage about their own chances of success may increase or decrease
the probability that they apply, depending on the magnitude of application and failure
costs.
Our preferred explanation for the lower application rate and the higher success
rate of connected individuals observed in the data is that, in a context where the
application costs are limited, connected candidates are better informed about their
chances of success and they also benefit from a connection premium in evaluations,
either due to favoritism or to the better observability of their quality. The information
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channel dominates at the application stage, leading to a positive selection of connected
individuals among applicants.
We also examine a potential alternative explanation for why connected researchers
are less likely to apply and more likely to succeed. It may be that the majority of
connected researchers benefit from a positive evaluation premium, but a few expect to
be penalized by their connections and thus decide not to apply. However, we do not find
support for this hypothesis in the data. Connected researchers who chose not to apply
in the first evaluation round are more likely to reapply and to succeed in the following
round of the national assessment, which took place one year later and was carried out
by the same committee members. They also tend to receive more favorable evaluations
from their connections in the committee relative to the assessments that they receive
from other reviewers. In sum, there is no indication that the lower application rate
of connected researchers is driven by their fear of a less favorable evaluation. Instead,
their informational advantage at the application stage seems to have helped connected
researchers with a weak profile to optimize the timing of their applications.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. While the previous litera-
ture has mostly focused on the direct impact of professional networks on productivity
and on evaluations, we show that connections also help to make better application de-
cisions. This informational advantage may be particularly valuable in contexts where
applications are costly and the outcome of the evaluation is subject to uncertainty,
such as applying for a grant, for a position, or selecting the outlet for submitting an
academic paper. This feature of connections might also partly explain the large suc-
cess of some mentoring programs (e.g., Blau et al. 2010). A related literature has also
studied whether male and female researchers have different propensities to apply for
promotions in academia. Using information from scientific evaluations in France and
Italy, Bosquet, Combes, and Penalosa (2019) and Bagues, Sylos-Labini and Zinovyeva
(2017) document that female researchers have a lower probability to apply, which may
affect negatively their chances of being promoted. However, the gender gap in ap-
plications does not seem to be affected by the gender composition of the committee
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(Bagues, Sylos-Labini and Zinovyeva 2017).
Our results also have important implications for empirical studies of evaluation bi-
ases and discrimination that rely on observational data. According to our analysis,
when prospective candidates can observe the identity of evaluators and applications
are costly, self-selection may be a major concern and might bias estimates. In the
context considered in our paper, connected individuals are positively selected among
applicants, and taking into account only information on actual applicants leads to an
overestimation of the connection premium by 29%, despite the availability of an ex-
tensive set of controls which accounts for about half of the variation in evaluations. A
similar problem may arise in other contexts. For instance, Fisman, Shi, Wang, and
Xu (2017) examine the election of fellows of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and
Engineering, and document that the success rate of applicants who share hometown
ties with evaluators is 39% higher than other applicants with a similar publication
record, a gap that the authors attribute to favoritism. This estimate might be biased
if prospective candidates anticipate the existence of favoritism at the application stage
or if connected researchers are better informed about their chances of success. The
problem is not limited to the analysis of connections in academia; it might also be
relevant for studies assessing evaluation biases related to gender, ethnic group, social
ties or reputation whenever the identity of evaluators is known to prospective can-
didates and failure is costly (e.g., Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Goldin and Rouse
2000; Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2000, 2005, Card and DellaVigna 2017). The di-
rection of self-selection in these studies is hard to predict and depends on the quality
of connected prospective applicants, the strength of evaluation biases, the degree of
information asymmetries, and the cost of failure.
Our results may also be relevant for a better understanding of the benefits of hiring
through employee referrals. According to the literature, referred applicants are more
likely to accept job offers, and they are also substantially less likely to quit (Simon
and Warner 1992, Burks et al. 2015). The standard explanation is that employers are
better informed about the quality of referred applicants. Additionally, it might also
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be that connected individuals are better informed not only about the existence of the
vacancy but also about the quality of the match.
Finally, the endogenous self-selection of candidates may also be relevant for the
interpretation of audit and correspondence studies. In these studies, fictitious appli-
cants look identical “on paper” except for some particular characteristic such as gender
or race. As pointed out by Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Neumark (2012), an
evaluator’s decision to select applicants from a particular group may reflect either taste
discrimination or statistical discrimination. Our analysis suggests that statistical dis-
crimination may occur even if the two groups have an identical distribution of quality
in the overall population, but one group is better informed about the evaluation pro-
cess or the characteristics of the job. Evaluators may expect applicants from these two
groups to differ due to self-selection.1
2 Theoretical framework
To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized conceptual framework of the
application decision process. The model aims to capture three relevant features. First,
applications may involve some costs, either in the form of specific investments or op-
portunity costs. Second, evaluators may be biased in favor of acquainted candidates.
Third, there may be information asymmetries both on the evaluators’ side and on
the researchers’ side. Evaluators may observe the quality of candidates imperfectly
and, likewise, prospective candidates may not be well informed about evaluators’ stan-
dards. These information asymmetries are lower when the evaluator and the candidate
are connected.
The model illustrates that the impact of connections on application decisions is
ambiguous. If evaluators are positively biased towards connected researchers, these
1Incidentally, this might perhaps explain the results in Milkman, Akinola and Chugh (2015), who
conduct an audit study in which fictional prospective students contact professors in order to discuss
research opportunities before applying to a doctoral program. Faculty members are significantly less
responsive to students with a foreign-sounding name even if, by construction, their messages were
otherwise identical. A possible explanation, within the framework of our study, is that employers
prejudge native prospective students to be better informed about their fit.
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researchers will have a stronger incentive to apply. However, if connections also convey
information to potential applicants on evaluation standards or if they provide infor-
mation to evaluators on the quality of candidates, connections may either increase or
decrease the probability of applying. As we explain below, the direction of the effect
depends on the extent of information asymmetries, evaluators’ priors about applicants
quality, and the cost associated with the application.
2.1 Benchmark
We start with a benchmark case where there are no information asymmetries or biases.
The evaluation process has the following time structure. First, an individual i (he) and
an evaluator j (she) are randomly drawn from the population of prospective candidates
and eligible evaluators. Second, individual i decides whether to apply for an evaluation.
Let ai = 1 if the candidate applies, and ai = 0 otherwise. Finally, if candidate i applies,
evaluator j decides whether he qualifies or not. Let sij = 1 if the candidate is promoted,
and sij = 0 if he is not.
Prospective candidates differ in terms of their quality, qi. A proportion α ∈ (0, 1)
of prospective candidates have quality equal to one, while 1 − α have quality equal
to zero. Eligible evaluators differ in terms of their evaluation standards, uj. A share
β ∈ (0, 1) of evaluators have high standards, uh, and the rest have low standards, ul,
where 1 > uh > 0 > ul. Candidates and evaluators are assumed to be risk-neutral.
If an individual applies and fails, he incurs a cost C > 0. The net gain of applying
and qualifying is equal to one, and if an individual does not apply his payoff is equal
to zero. The payoff of the prospective candidate can be described as follows:
Ui := ai[sij − (1− sij)C].
The payoff of the evaluator is equal to the quality of candidate i if she promotes him,
and it is equal to uj if the candidate fails:
Uj := sijqi − (1− sij)uj.
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When the evaluator has low standards (uj = ul), she promotes all candidates indepen-
dently of their quality. When the evaluation threshold is high (uj = uh), the evaluator
promotes only high-quality candidates. Consequently, prospective applicants only ap-
ply when their quality is high or when the evaluator has a low evaluation standard.
Overall, the probability that a prospective candidate applies is:
p(ai = 1) = α + (1− α)(1− β), (1)
and the expected quality of applicants is equal to:
E(qi|ai = 1) =
α
α + (1− α)(1− β)
. (2)
All applicants get promoted. Therefore, unconditional on his application decision, the
probability that a prospective candidate gets promoted is equal to:
p(sij = 1) = α + (1− α)(1− β), (3)
which is also equal to his expected payoff:
E(Ui) = α + (1− α)(1− β). (4)
2.2 Connections
Let us consider two different groups of individuals, connected and unconnected, and let
us assume that these two groups are drawn from the same population. We investigate
how connections affect application decisions and evaluation outcomes in three different
scenarios: (i) evaluators are biased in favor of connected candidates, (ii) evaluators are
better informed about the quality of connected candidates, (iii) connected candidates
are better informed about evaluation standards. We discuss below each scenario and
we summarize the main results in Table 1.
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2.2.1 Evaluation bias in favor of connected candidates.
To formalize the existence of bias in favor of connected candidates, let us assume that
the evaluator’s payoff is equal to Uj = sij(qi + B ∗ Iij) − (1 − sij)uj, where Iij is an
indicator function that takes value one if individual i has a connection with evaluator j.
For simplicity, we assume that the bias in favor of connected applicants is sufficiently
large to guarantee that they always succeed, independently of their own quality or
whether the evaluator has high or low standards (B > uh).
In this setup, connected individuals always apply and succeed. Instead, as in the
benchmark case, unconnected individuals only apply if they belong to the high-quality
type or if they are low-quality and the evaluator has low standards (see equation (1)).
As shown in the upper panel of Table 1, connected candidates tend to be negatively
selected among applicants. The expected quality of connected applicants is equal to
α, which is lower than the expected quality of unconnected ones. Moreover, connected
individuals are more likely to be promoted, and they have a higher payoff.
2.2.2 Information asymmetries on the evaluator side
Let us consider now the case when there are no evaluation biases, but there exist infor-
mation asymmetries regarding the quality of unconnected candidates. For simplicity,
we assume that evaluators observe perfectly the quality of connected candidates, but
they do not observe the quality of unconnected ones.
Connected individuals behave as in the benchmark case. The application decision
of unconnected individuals depends on how selective is the process. When the degree
of selectivity is low (α > uh), all evaluators are willing to promote unconnected can-
didates and, anticipating that, all unconnected individuals apply and get promoted.
On the contrary, when the process is selective (ul < α ≤ uh), only low-standard eval-
uators would be willing to promote unconnected candidates. Therefore, unconnected
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individuals only apply if the evaluator has low grading standards:
p(ai = 1|Iij = 0) =

1 if α > uh,
1− β if α ≤ uh.
As in the previous case, all applicants qualify, and the probability of success and the
payoffs are similar to the probability of applying.
The second panel of Table 1 compares the situation of connected and unconnected
individuals. When the process is not selective, unconnected individuals benefit from
the information asymmetry. They are relatively more likely to apply and also to qual-
ify. On the contrary, when the process is selective, the information asymmetry hurts
unconnected individuals. In this case, they have a lower probability to apply and to
succeed.2
2.2.3 Information asymmetries on the candidate side
Finally, let us consider the existence of information asymmetries regarding the evalua-
tion standards. Let us assume that while connected individuals observe the standards
of the evaluator, unconnected ones cannot.
Connected individuals behave as in the benchmark case. High-quality individu-
als always apply, and low-quality ones only apply when they observe that evaluation
standards are low. Unconnected individuals cannot condition their application on
evaluation standards. They always apply if their quality is high, but the behavior of
low-quality ones depends on the cost of failure. They only apply if the costs associated
with failure are low enough relative to the expected benefits of winning (C < 1−β
β
).
The ex ante probability that unconnected candidates apply is:
p(ai = 1|Iij = 0) =

1 if C < 1−β
β
,
α if C ≥ 1−β
β
.
2This result is essentially similar to the findings of the seminal models of statistical discrimination
by Aigner and Cain (1977) and Cornell and Welch (1996).
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We compare the situation of connected and unconnected individuals in the lower
panel of Table 1. When costs are low, connected individuals are relatively less likely
to apply, and they tend to be positively selected among applicants. On the contrary,
when costs are high, connected individuals are more likely to apply, and they tend to
be negatively selected among applicants.
The expected payoff of connected individuals is always higher. They apply if and
only if they qualify. Instead, unconnected individuals are hurt by the lack of informa-
tion. When costs are low, some low-quality individuals apply and face high evaluation
standards. Instead, when costs are high, some low-quality individuals fail to apply
even if standards are low, foregoing the benefits associated with promotion.
The above model highlights that the impact of connections on candidates’ applica-
tion behavior depends on the underlying content of these connections. If connections
imply a positive evaluation bias, connected candidates are relatively more likely to
apply and to succeed, and they tend to be negatively selected into the application.
However, if connections decrease information asymmetries between the candidate and
the evaluator, the impact of connections on application behavior becomes ambiguous.
If there are information asymmetries about applicants’ quality, the impact of con-
nections depends on how selective is the evaluation. When evaluators are not selective,
connected individuals are less likely to apply than unconnected ones, and they also
have lower chances of success. However, when evaluators are selective, connected can-
didates benefit from the availability of better information about their own quality, and
they are more likely to apply and also to succeed.
There may also be information asymmetries about evaluators’ standards. In this
case, application behavior depends crucially on the cost of applying and failing. When
the cost is sufficiently low, connected individuals are less likely to apply than uncon-
nected ones. On the contrary, when the cost of applying is high, connected individuals
are more likely to apply.
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3 Background
Most Italian universities are public, and the recruitment of full and associate profes-
sors is regulated by national laws.3 Before 2010, recruitment procedures were managed
locally by each university. In 2010, a two-stage procedure similar to those already
in place in other European countries was approved (e.g., France and Spain).4 In the
first stage, candidates to associate professor and full professor positions are required
to qualify in a national-level evaluation known as the National Scientific Qualification
(Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale). Evaluations are conducted separately in 184 sci-
entific fields designed by the Ministry of Education. A positive assessment is valid
for four years while a negative one implies a ban on participating in further national
evaluations during the following two years. Qualified candidates can participate in the
second stage, which is managed locally by each university.
The first National Scientific Qualification was performed between 2012 and 2014.5
The timeline of the process is described in Figure 1. The call for eligible evaluators was
published in June 2012. The deadline for professors to volunteer to be an evaluator
was August 28. In the meantime, the call for candidates’ applications was issued in
July. Below we describe in more detail the structure of the process.
3.1 Pre-registration of candidates
Prospective candidates had to pre-register an application online by November 20 2012,
before the composition of committees was known. The submission package included
the CV and up to 20 selected publications. Researchers were able to pre-register to
multiple fields and positions.
For most academics based in Italian universities pre-registration involved just a triv-
ial cost of confirming the publication list already present in their accounts at the Min-
3According to OECD (2013), in 2011 about 92% of students in tertiary education were enrolled in
66 public universities and the remaining 8% in 29 independent private institutions.
4Law number 240/2010, also known as “Gelmini reform” after the name of the minister of Educa-
tion.
5A detailed description of the process is available at http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/
index.php?lang=eng, retrieved on February 2014.
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istry webpage and submitting the application.6 For applicants from outside academia
or from abroad, pre-registration required creating a personal account on the Ministry
webpage and filling in information on publications and qualifications.
3.2 Selection of committees
Once the application deadline for candidates was closed, committee members were
selected by random draw from the pool of eligible evaluators in the corresponding field.
These lotteries were held between late November 2012 and February 2013. The same
committee had to evaluate candidates for associate and full professorships. Evaluators
were in charge for two rounds of the national scientific qualification.
The pool of eligible evaluators included full professors in the corresponding field
who have volunteered for the task and satisfied some minimum quality requirements.
In math, engineering, and natural and life sciences, evaluators were required a research
production above the median of full professors in the field in at least two of the following
three dimensions: (i) the number of articles published in scientific journals covered
by ISI Web of Science, (ii) the number of citations, (iii) and the H-index.7 In the
social sciences and the humanities, eligible evaluators were required to have a research
production above the median in at least one of the following three dimensions: (i)
the number of articles published in high quality scientific journals (in what follows, A-
journals), (ii) the overall number of articles published in any scientific journals and book
chapters, and (iii) the number of published books.8 Eligible evaluators could be based in
Italy (hereafter ‘Italian’) or affiliated to a university from an OECD country (hereafter
‘international’). International and Italian eligible evaluators had to satisfy the same
research requirements, but their remuneration differed. While Italian evaluators worked
6Many Italian universities automatically feed information on publications of their researchers to
individual accounts at the Ministry webpage. Previously entered information on publications is also
available for the rest of researchers who had ever applied for a research grant of the Ministry or who
had participated in another evaluation.
7More precisely, this rule applies to Mathematics and IT, Physics, Chemistry, Earth Sciences,
Biology, Medicine, Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences, Civil Engineering and Architecture (with
the exception of Design, Architectural and Urban design, Drawing, Architectural Restoration, and
Urban and Regional Planning), Industrial and Information Engineering, and Psychology.
8An evaluation agency and several scientific committees determined the set of high-quality journals
in each field.
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pro bono, OECD evaluators received e16,000 for their participation. Italian evaluators
could ask for a teaching load reduction during their service at the national committee.
Evaluation committees included five members. Four members were randomly drawn
from the pool of eligible Italian evaluators, under the constraint that no university can
have more than one evaluator within the committee. The fifth member was selected
from the pool of eligible international evaluators.9 The randomization procedure leaves
little room for manipulation. Eligible reviewers in each field were ordered alphabetically
and were assigned a number according to their position. A sequence of numbers was
then randomly selected. The same sequence was applied to select committee members
in a number of different fields. If an evaluator resigned, a substitute reviewer was
selected randomly from the corresponding group of eligible evaluators.
3.3 General evaluation criteria
Following their appointment, each evaluation committee had to draft and to publish
online a document describing the general criteria that would be used to grant positive
evaluations. Committees had full autonomy on the exact criteria to be used in the
evaluation. Moreover, an independent evaluation agency (ANVUR), appointed by
the Ministry, collected and publicized information on the research productivity of all
candidates in the previous ten years. This productivity was first measured by the same
three bibliometric indicators employed to select evaluators and was then normalized
by taking into account the amount of time passed since first publication and also
the number of job interruptions (this last typically related to parental leave). The
evaluation agency also reported the median research productivity in these bibliometric
dimensions for professors in the corresponding category. Committees were not obliged,
though encouraged, to use this information.10
To have a better understanding of how informative were the documents released
by committees’ describing their evaluation criteria, we have analyzed these documents.
9Exceptionally, whenever the pool of international professors includes less than four professors, all
five committee members are drawn from the pool of eligible evaluators based in Italy.
10The system has slightly changed in recent years. Since 2016 candidates are required to satisfy
some bibliometric criteria in order to be eligible.
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The information provided by most committees was rather vague. Out of 184 commit-
tees, only 15 of them specified sufficient conditions for a positive evaluation.11 About a
third of the committees specified necessary conditions, typically related to the biblio-
metric indicators provided by the evaluation agency,12 and the remaining committees
simply reproduced the general instructions from the official call for applications.13
3.4 Final application decision
The median committee took two and a half months to prepare and publish the doc-
ument with the evaluation criteria. Pre-registered candidates could withdraw their
applications at any point of time between the selection of committee members and
two weeks after the public announcement of the general evaluation criteria. Overall,
candidates had about three months to decide whether they wanted to proceed with
their application. When the list of applicants was finally closed, evaluation commit-
tees were officially informed about the identity of final applicants and the evaluation
took place. Naturally, we cannot directly observe whether evaluators shared with some
pre-registered candidates any private information about their chances of success, but
anecdotal evidence that has been provided to us during the preparation of this study
indicates that, in various occasions, such communications did indeed take place.
11For instance, a committee in Political Economy stated that “a sufficient condition to obtain a
qualification for associate professorship is to satisfy at least one of the following requirements (based
on the publications in the previous 10 years): 1) have at least 2 articles in A-journals as defined by
the evaluation agency, 2) have at least 3 articles in scientific journals included in the database Web
of Science, Social Science Citation Index, Economics, 3) have at least 5 articles in scientific journals
included in database Scopus, Economics, Econometrics and Finance.”
1246 committees required that candidates’ research production, as measured by bibliometric indi-
cators, was above the median for professors in the corresponding rank, and 36 committees introduced
some additional requirement.
13For instance, in Econometrics the committee announced that “(i)n order to assess the scientific
maturity of the candidates, the Committee will give prominent weight to the evaluation of their
scientific publications, especially those published in top journals. The publications will be evaluated
on the basis of their originality, innovativeness, methodological rigor, international reach and impact,
and relevance for the field. In order to assess journal articles, the Committee may use the classification
of journals provided by ANVUR and the bibliometric indicators provided by Web of Science and
Scopus. The Committee may also use information regarding the impact of each publication and the
total number of citations received by the candidate.”
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3.5 The evaluation
The evaluations were (officially) based only on candidates’ CVs and publications. There
were no oral or written tests or interviews. Committee members met periodically
to discuss their assessments and cast their votes. A positive assessment required a
qualified majority of four positive votes (out of five committee members). Only kinship
relationships between evaluators and candidates were officially subject to the conflict
of interest rule. In these cases, the evaluator could not participate in the deliberation
and the voting decision. Notably, Ph.D. advisors, coauthors and colleagues were not
affected by the conflict of interest rules.
At the end of the process, committees provided each candidate with (i) the final
outcome of the evaluation (pass or failure), (ii) a collective report explaining the criteria
used by the committee and how they reached their final decision and (iii) five individual
reports explaining each evaluators’ position. Figure 2 provides a sample of an individual
evaluation report.
Applicants who received a positive evaluation were eligible for a promotion at the
university level. Those candidates who withdrew their application could participate in
the qualification exam that was conducted the following year, but those who did not
withdraw and failed to qualify had to skip two evaluation rounds before they could
apply again.14 Our analysis of publication data also shows that most individuals who
participated in the evaluation process were still active researchers in the following years.
About 97% of pre-registered candidates with a permanent university position at the
time of the evaluation and 79% of those with a fixed term contract published at least
one article in years 2014-2016.15 The figure is slightly lower among researchers who
failed the evaluation: 95% and 75% respectively.
14In practice, the system experienced several changes after the second evaluation round, and the
third round was delayed for several years. The new call for candidates was announced only in the fall
of 2016.
15We collected this information from the publication repository of Italian public universities called
Institutional Research Information System (IRIS). This repository was developed by ANVUR and
currently the database covers information on 60 out of 70 Italian universities.
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4 Data
We consider all evaluations held within the first two rounds of the National Scientific
Qualification. The database includes examinations for associate and full professorships
in 184 academic fields. We describe below the available information on (i) the pool of
eligible and actual evaluators; (ii) the pool of pre-registered and actual applicants and
(iii) the evaluation outcome.16
4.1 Evaluators
Around six thousand professors, all based in Italy, volunteered and qualified to be in the
pool of eligible evaluators. The number of professors in the pool of eligible evaluators
based abroad was slightly above one thousand. In the average field, the pool of eligible
evaluators includes 32 Italian professors and eight international professors.
Table 2 provides some descriptive information on eligible evaluators. The average
CV includes around 131 research outputs, mostly journal articles (73), book chapters
(22), and conference proceedings (20). The average CV also includes 0.42 patents. As
a proxy for the quality of journal articles, we have collected information on the quality
of the journals in which they were published. In social sciences and humanities, we
use the official list of A-journals that was compiled by the Italian evaluation agency.
This list includes approximately 7,000 academic journals. In sciences, we consider the
Article Influence Score (AIS) of journals.17
About 8% of Italian evaluators drawn in the initial lottery resigned and were
replaced by other (randomly selected) eligible evaluators. The resignation rate was
slightly higher among international reviewers (10%).
16We collected the CVs of prospective candidates and evaluators and the final evaluations from the
webpage of the Ministry of Education. To avoid problems with homonymity, we have excluded 14
candidates that had the same name and surname as other candidates within the same field and rank.
17This indicator is available for all publications in the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. It is
related to Impact Factor, but it takes into account the quality of the citing journals, the propensity




More than 46,000 researchers pre-registered in the first round of the national scientific
qualification, including approximately 28,000 applicants who held an assistant or an
associate professor position in an Italian university. This accounts for around 63% of
assistant professors and 60% of associate professors in Italy.18 One-third of candidates
registered in several fields (e.g.: qualification to full professorship in Political Economy
and qualification to full professorship in Applied Economics) or in different categories
of the same field (e.g., qualification to full and associate professorships in Political
Economy). In total there were 69,020 pre-registered applications, approximately 375
per field.
In the upper panel of Table 3, columns 1 and 2 provide information on the charac-
teristics of the initial set of pre-registered applications, and columns 3 and 4 distinguish
between candidates to a position of full and associate professor. As expected, in evalu-
ation exams for a position of full professor applicants tend to be relatively older than in
associate professor evaluations (49 vs. 43 years old). Applicants to full professorships
are also less likely to be female (31% vs. 41%) and they are more likely to hold a
permanent position in an Italian university (74% vs. 47%). The average CV has 16
pages and, it reports 64 research outputs, mostly journal articles (37). It also includes
some books (2), book chapters (7), conference proceedings (10), and patents (0.24).
A typical paper is coauthored by six authors, with only 34% of papers being single
authored. The candidate reports being the first author in 22% of the occasions. Not
surprisingly, candidates to full professor positions have a relatively longer publication
record: 89 vs. 53 publications. In social sciences and humanities, the average candi-
date for a position of full professor has published six articles in A-journals; applicants
to associate professorships have published only three. In sciences, the average AIS
of papers published by candidates for a position of full professor is around 1.31; it is
similar for candidates to associate professorships. We have also constructed a proxy
18These figures are based on our own calculations using information from the Italian Ministry of
Education on the identity of all assistant (Ricercatori) and associate professors (Associati) in Italy
on December 31, 2012.
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for the timing of the application. We use the application code number, which reflects
the ordering of application, and we normalize this variable uniformly between 0 and 1
for applicants within the same list. This measure might potentially be correlated with
candidates’ quality or with their self-confidence.
Around one-seventh of applications were withdrawn by applicants when the identity
of evaluators and the general evaluation criteria were revealed. For the final set of appli-
cations, the evaluation agency of the Ministry of Education constructed and published
online information on candidates’ research production during the ten previous years
measured along three bibliometric dimensions described earlier. The evaluation agency
also compared candidates research output with the median in the corresponding field
and position. This information is summarized in the lower panel of Table 3. Around
38% of the final candidacies were above the median in each of the three dimensions.
On the other end of the scale, 16% were below the median in every dimension.
4.3 Connections
We consider three types of links between candidates and evaluators: coauthorships,
affiliation to the same institution, and Ph.D. advisor-advisee relationship. Information
on coauthors and affiliation comes from the official CVs of candidates and evalua-
tors, while information on thesis supervision is from the online public access catalogue
(OPAC) of the National Library of Florence (BNCF).19
Approximately 12% of pre-registered candidates were assigned to a committee in-
cluding a colleague, around 7% to a committee including a coauthor, and 0.8% to a
committee with a Ph.D. advisor. In about a third of the cases, the coauthor also be-
longs to the same university. About a third of Ph.D. advisors have coauthored with
their advisees. Overall, 84% of pre-registered candidates have no connections in the
committee, 15.2% are connected to one committee member, and 0.8% are connected
with two or more committee members.
19Starting from 1986, Italian public universities are obliged to deposit a copy of each doctoral thesis
of their PhD students at the BNSF. A detailed description of the database can be found in Coda
Zabetta and Geuna (2017).
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In the National Scientific Qualification, Ph.D advisors, coauthors and colleagues
are not formally subject to a conflict of interest rule. Nonetheless, committees might
autonomously decide to self-impose their own additional restrictions. According to our
analysis of the evaluation reports, evaluators voluntarily abstained in the presence of
a colleague, a coauthor or an advisee in only three fields (out of a total 184).20
Pre-registered candidates with a connection in the evaluation committee tend to
have a significantly better research profile relative to the rest of the candidates (columns
5-7, Table 3). Connected candidates excel both in quantity and quality of research.21
4.4 Evaluations
Table 4 provides information on the outcome of the evaluation process. The upper
panel shows information on the first round of evaluations. Out of the initial set of
69,020 pre-registered applications, approximately 14% were withdrawn and did not
receive an evaluation, 49% failed the evaluation, and 37% were successful. Success
is strongly correlated with candidates’ observable research productivity. As shown in
Figure 3, only 4% of candidates whose quality was below the median in the three
bibliometric dimensions managed to succeed, compared to a 63% success rate among
candidates who excelled in all three dimensions.
Each committee member writes an individual evaluation report for each applica-
tion. Overall there are approximately 295,000 individual reports.22 The average report
includes around 176 words; it briefly describes the research production of the candi-
date and provides some discussion about its quality and its fit with the field. It also
indicates the evaluator’s final assessment on whether the candidate deserves qualifica-
tion. We have conducted a text analysis of these reports in order to identify the final
assessment. On most occasions, the final decision was reached unanimously by all five
20These three fields are Ecology (sector 05/C1), Pediatrics (06/G1) and Management (13/B2). As
a result, 84 candidates in these fields received only four evaluation reports.
21We also observe that junior researchers from Italian departments that have more eligible evaluators
among senior colleagues are more likely to pre-register for an evaluation before the final composition
of committees is known. It may be because they anticipate a higher chance of having a connection on
the evaluation panel, but it may also reflect a positive association between the quality of the senior
and the junior faculty at the department level.
22Due to a technical problem, we are missing information on evaluation reports of 202 applications.
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evaluators (86%). Overall, 45% of votes were favorable to the candidate and 55% were
negative.
Those candidates who had withdrawn the application in the first round of eval-
uations had a chance to participate in the second round, which was conducted the
following year and was evaluated by the same committees. Around 37% of these can-
didates chose to reapply. Out of the group of those who had reapplied, 58% managed
to qualify.23
Candidates who qualify in the National Scientific Qualification can later apply for
a promotion at the university level. Out of all researchers who pre-registered for the
first round of evaluations and who qualified for the corresponding position either in
the first or the second round, by December 2015 about 35% had been promoted to an
associate professor position and 11% had been promoted to a full professor position.
5 Empirical analysis
Our three measures of connections - coauthors, colleagues, and thesis advisors - may
capture different dimensions. Colleagues are in general expected to be close in social
terms but not necessarily intellectually. They might have private information on can-
didates’ contribution to professional service and, sometimes, they might be perhaps
directly affected by the outcome of the evaluation. Coauthors and advisors are prob-
ably closer both in the social space and the ideas space. Nonetheless, in what follows,
given that we find that empirically the impact of the three types of connections is
statistically similar, we report the effect of all types of connections jointly.24
The structure of the empirical analysis is as follows. First, we estimate the causal
effect of connections upon researchers’ application decisions and their impact on evalu-
ators’ assessments (sections 5.1-5.3). Then, using the conceptual framework presented
in section 2, we examine which of the three mechanisms considered – bias, informed
23In this second round, we have obtained information on the final assessment for all candidates, but
we collected individual evaluation reports only in those fields that had completed evaluations by May
2015 (116 out of 184 fields).
24We analyze the effect of coauthors, colleagues and Ph.D. advisors separately in Table A1 in the
Appendix.
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evaluators or informed applicants – are consistent with the evidence (section 5.4). In
section 5.5, we investigate the empirical relevance of self-selection, and we quantify
the bias incurred by an analysis that estimates the impact of connections on evalua-
tions using only information on actual applicants. Finally, we examine the longer-term
effects of connections (sections 5.6 and 5.7) and discuss the external validity of our
results (section 5.8).
5.1 The impact of connections on applications
According to the conceptual framework presented in section 2, if evaluators are biased in
favor of connected candidates, this would encourage researchers with a connection in the
committee to apply and we would expect connected candidates to be negatively selected
among applicants. On the other hand, if connections reduce information asymmetries,
their impact on application decisions is ambiguous and depends on how selective is the
process and how large is the cost of failing relative to the gains.
In order to estimate the causal impact of connections on researchers’ application
decisions, we need an empirical strategy that deals with the potential endogeneity of
connections. As shown in Table 3, researchers who have a connection in the evaluation
committee tend to have a stronger research profile and, presumably, might also differ
in some unobserved dimensions. We identify exogenous variations in the availability
of a connection in the committee exploiting the random selection of its members. We
compare the application behavior of pre-registered researchers who initially have similar
chances of having a connection in the committee but, due to the random draw, differ
in terms of the actual number of connections that they end up having in the evaluation
committee:
yi,c = β0 + β1Connectionsi,c + Di,cβ2 + µc + εi,c, (5)
where yi,c is a dummy variable that takes value one if researcher i who pre-registered for
evaluation in exam c (e.g., qualification for an associate professorship in Econometrics)
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applies. Di,c represents a set of indicator variables for the number of connections that
researcher i expects to have in committee c before the random selection takes place.25
Connectionsi,c indicates the number of connected committee members selected in the
initial random draw (typically none or one). Note that a few evaluators (8%) resigned
and were replaced by other (randomly chosen) eligible evaluators and, as a result,
the number of connections in the initial committee might differ slightly from the final
composition of the committee at the time of the evaluation. Therefore, in the baseline
specification coefficient β1 captures the so-called intention-to-treat effect (ITT). Given
that information on connections is only available for evaluators based in Italy (four out
of the five committee members), our estimates may be subject to an attenuation bias.
To increase the accuracy of the estimation, we include in the equation a set of
exam fixed effects (µc), accounting for possible differences in the average success rate
across different fields and positions. In some specifications, we also control for the
set of predetermined individual characteristics and quality indicators listed in Table
3 (Xi), all interacted with discipline fixed effects. In all regressions, standard errors
are clustered at the field level, thus reflecting that evaluations within each field are
conducted by the same committee.
The key identifying assumption of the analysis is that, conditional on the num-
ber of connections that an individual has in the pool of eligible evaluators (Di,c), the
outcome of the random lottery that decides committee composition is not correlated
with any relevant unobservable characteristic of the researcher. The way in which the
randomization was implemented suggests that there was little room for manipulation.
Nonetheless, we explicitly test the randomness of the assignment. We estimate a spec-
ification similar to equation (5), but we consider as dependent variables all observable
predetermined characteristics of individual i (xi). As shown in Table 5, the results
25The rule of the draw limited to one the number of evaluators in the same committee from the same
university. In order to take this restriction into account, we have computed the expected committee
composition as an average of one million simulated draws of five committee members from the pool
of eligible evaluators, substituting eventual cases of multiple evaluators from the same university with
other random draws. We have then rounded the expected committee composition to two decimal
places and created indicator variables for each value. All results, are practically identical if we control
for the expected number of connections using a linear specification instead of a set of dummies.
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from these randomization tests are consistent with the assignment being random. Re-
searchers who obtain, through the luck of the draw, a connection in the evaluation
committee are statistically similar to other researchers. They are (statistically) as
likely to be female, to hold a permanent position, and they have a similar publication
record and number of coauthors. Out of ten coefficients that capture the correlation
between the random shock to committee composition and researchers’ characteristics,
only one is statistically significant at 5% level. The existence of random assignment is
confirmed by the corresponding F-test for the joint significance of the estimates.26
The upper panel of Table 6 reports the main estimates from equation (5). Re-
searchers are significantly less likely to apply when they are assigned, through the luck
of the draw, to a committee that includes a connection. The presence of a coauthor, a
colleague or an advisor in the initial committee decreases the probability of applying
by 2.7 p.p. (column 1). As expected, these estimates are unchanged when we control
for predetermined individual characteristics and observable productivity (column 2).
In column 3, we consider the presence of connections in the committee that con-
ducted the evaluations. The final composition of the committee differs from the initial
one due to the resignation of some evaluators. To account for the potential endogene-
ity of these resignations, we instrument the final composition of committees using the
initial composition that was determined by the random draw. As expected, the in-
strumental variable (IV) estimate is slightly larger in absolute terms than ITT. The
presence of a connection in the committee decreases by 2.0 p.p. the probability that
the pre-registered candidate goes ahead with his application. This amounts to a 3.4%
decrease in the application rate relative to a baseline application rate of 86% or, equiva-
lently, a 22% increase in the probability of withdrawal relative to a baseline withdrawal
rate of 14%.
We also analyze how application decisions vary depending on researchers’ observable
quality (columns 4-6). We split the sample into three groups based on researchers’
publication record. In science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine
26F-test of the null hypothesis that all ten coefficients are jointly equal to zero is 0.96 (Prob > F
= 0.328).
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(STEM&Med fields), we classify prospective applicants based on their total Article
Influence Score and in social sciences and humanities we use the number of A-journal
publications. The impact of connections on applications is driven by the decisions
of researchers with weaker research profile. Connections do not have any significant
impact on the application decisions of researchers in the top tercile but, for researchers
in the lowest tercile, the presence of a coauthor or a colleague in the committee decreases
the likelihood to apply by about 6.2 p.p (7.8%). The difference between the estimated
impact of connections on applying is statistically significant at 1%.
We also explore whether our results are driven by the strategic considerations that
may arise when there are several applicants from the same university. If there is
an evaluator from this institution in the committee and she has a preference for one
particular candidate, other researchers from this institution may decide to withdraw
their application if they expect the evaluator to behave strategically, giving them a
negative assessment in order to ensure that her preferred candidate faces no competition
later on when he applies for a promotion at the university level. As we show in Table
A3 in the Appendix, the evidence is not consistent with this explanation. The negative
impact of connections on applications decisions is also observed when there are no other
applicants from the same university.27
5.2 The impact of connections on researchers’ chances of suc-
cess
Next, we estimate the causal impact of connections on the success rate of researchers,
unconditional on whether they applied or not. We estimate equation (5) using as
dependent variable an indicator which takes value one if pre-registered candidate i
qualifies in examination c and value zero if he failed or withdrew the application. As
shown in the first column of panel B in Table 6, the presence of a connection in the
committee increases by 3.9 p.p. the probability of success of pre-registered candi-
27We have also investigated how other characteristics of the relationship between evaluators and
prospective applicants affect application decisions. The two dimensions that we observe – gender and
subfield similarity – do not play a significant role. These results are available upon request.
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dates (11% relative to the baseline success rate of 34%). The inclusion of individual
controls increases threefold the explained variation in the dependent variable – the
adjusted R-squared increases from 11% to 31% – but, as expected, it does not affect
the point estimates significantly (column 2). The estimates are slightly larger, around
4.6 p.p., although statistically similar, when we instrument the final composition of
the committee using the initial one (column 3). We also examine how the impact of
connections varies depending on researchers’ observable research productivity (columns
4-6). Better-published researchers benefit more from connections. Researchers in the
top (bottom) tercile experience a 5.2 p.p. (2.9 p.p.) increase in their success rate when
the committee includes a coauthor or a colleague, though the difference between the
impact of connections on top tercile and bottom tercile researchers is only significant
at 10%.
Our analysis so far shows that connected candidates are significantly less likely to
apply, but they have significantly higher unconditional success rates. By construction,
these findings imply that their chances of failing an exam must be substantially lower.
In fact, as shown in column 3, the probability that candidates with a connections in
the committee apply and receive a negative assessment is 7.5 p.p. lower. Candidates
with a weaker research profile benefit more from this decrease in failure rates. In the
bottom tercile, the failure rate of connected candidates is 9.1 p.p. lower, compared to
a decrease of 6.1 p.p. for connected candidates in the top tercile (columns 4-6). In
sum, candidates benefit from the presence of a connection in the committee in different
ways depending on the quality of these same candidates. While top candidates face
a relatively larger increase in success rates, candidates with a weaker research profile
experience a relatively larger decrease in application rates.
Since the voting at the committee level required qualified majority of four positive
votes, there may be important non-linearities in the impact of connections. We explore
this issue in Table A2 in the Appendix. Around 1% of candidates were assigned two
or more connections. We find that the rate of withdrawal of connected candidates
does not vary significantly with the number of connections in the committee. However,
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candidates with two or more connections in the committee are three times more likely
to succeed than candidates with just one connection.
5.2.1 Individual evaluation reports
We now turn to the information provided by evaluators’ individual assessments. We
compare the assessments received by the same candidate from different evaluators:
yi,j,c = β0 + β1Connectioni,j + µi + λj + εi,j,c, (6)
where yi,j,c is a dummy variable that takes value one if evaluator j voted in favor of
candidate i’s application in qualification exam c. Connectioni,j is a dummy variable
indicating whether the candidate and the evaluator have coauthored in the past, they
are based in the same institution, or the evaluator advised the candidate’s doctoral
thesis. A set of application fixed effects (µi) controls for potential differences in the
characteristics of candidates. In our preferred specification, we also include evaluators’
fixed effects (λj), which capture any potential differences in grading standards across
evaluators. Coefficient β1 captures the differences in the assessments received by each
candidate from connected and unconnected evaluators, which might reflect the poten-
tial existence of differences in their evaluation criteria or the available information.
Candidates are 3.9 p.p. (9%) more likely to get a positive vote from a colleague
or a coauthor, relative to the assessments they receive from other committee members
(Table 7, column 1). These results are unaffected when we include evaluators’ fixed
effects (column 2). We also examine how the connection premium varies depending on
the observable research output of candidates (columns 3-6). The premium is always
positive, and it is slightly larger for candidates of lower quality. The difference between
the top and bottom tercile is marginally significant.
The nature of the decision-making process may have biased down these estimates.
There may be less disagreement reflected in these final verdicts than there would have
been at interim stages. Despite this potential attenuation bias, the estimates are
significantly positive, indicating that evaluators on average tend to be more favorable
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towards their coauthors, colleagues, and advisees.
5.3 Heterogeneity across fields
Figure 4 provides information on the effect of connections on application behavior and
success rate across different disciplinary groups.28 While there is some heterogeneity in
terms of the magnitude of the effects, connections have a positive impact on evaluations
in all fields and a negative impact of applications in all fields except one.
5.4 Mechanism
The presence of a connection on the committee decreases the probability that re-
searchers with a weak research profile apply. At the same time, connected candidates
are relatively more likely to succeed and to receive a positive vote from their connection.
According to our theoretical framework, this pattern is consistent with three pos-
sible hypotheses. First, while connected evaluators may tend in general to favor their
acquaintances (e.g., Combes et al. 2008, Perotti 2002 or Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015),
in some particular cases they may be negatively biased against some of their connec-
tions (‘love or hate’ hypothesis). These researchers may anticipate that the connected
evaluator is biased against them and decide to withdraw the application.29 Second, it
may reflect a reduction in information asymmetries on the evaluators’ side (informed
evaluators hypothesis). Evaluators may observe more accurately the quality of con-
nected researchers. This reduction in information asymmetries benefits high-quality
connected applicants, but it decreases the chances of success of connected researchers
with relatively poor quality. If these researchers anticipate their disadvantage, they
may prefer not to apply. Finally, another possibility is that connected researchers
28In Italy, fields are officially classified in 14 disciplinary groups. Within this classification, we have
also considered separately Psychology and History (group 11), and Architecture and Civil Engineering
(group 8).
29This hypothesis is probably more plausible in the case of colleagues than in the case of coauthors
or advisors. For instance, in some universities faculty members may be associated to different chairs
that hold long-standing rivalries. Contrary to this intuition, we do not observe any difference between
the effect of colleagues and coauthors on application behavior and success. While the impact of Ph.D.
advisors on success is substantially higher than the impact of other connections, their impact on
application behavior is not statistically different from the impact of colleagues or coauthors.
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enjoy a connection premium in assessments but they are also better informed about
the evaluation criteria of connected committees (informed candidates hypothesis). The
availability of more accurate information might discourage some connected researchers
from applying if it is costly to fail, but this cost is not too high.
The first two explanations, the ‘love or hate’ hypothesis and the informed evalua-
tors hypothesis, imply that connected researchers who chose not to apply would have
received relatively less favorable evaluations, had they decided to apply. On the other
hand, according to the informed candidates hypothesis, connected researchers with a
weak research profile would still have benefited from connections in case they had ap-
plied. However, this advantage is not large enough to compensate the expected cost
of failure, which became more certain thanks to the presence of a connection in the
committee. We try to disentangle these possible explanations by using information on
researchers’ performance in the second round of the qualification exams, which took
place the following year. In this second round, only those researchers who had not
participated in the previous evaluation were allowed to apply. Most importantly, the
composition of committees did not change between the first and the second round.
Therefore, if connected researchers’ reason to withdraw their application in the first
round was that they anticipated some disadvantage in evaluations, these expectations
should also play a role in the second round of evaluations.
Around 37% of researchers who withdrew their application in the first round de-
cided to participate in the second round. The evidence seems to suggest that, at least
in the case of reapplicants, the decision to withdraw the application in the first round
was not driven by these candidates experiencing a disadvantage due to the better ob-
servability of their (poor) quality by evaluators or by the existence of a negative bias
against them.30 Researchers with a connection on the committee have a 4.7 p.p. (13%)
higher probability of reapplying relative to other researchers who withdrew their ap-
plication in the first round and, among those who reapplied, are 9.6 p.p. (17.5%) more
likely to succeed (Table 8, columns 1 and 2). The analysis of individual evaluations
30Connected researchers are positively selected among the pool of applicants who withdrew their
application in the first round, which might introduce an upward bias in the estimates.
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within committees confirms this interpretation. Connected researchers who reapply
tend to receive more favorable reports from their connections than from other commit-
tee members (Table 7, column 6). Overall, the evidence indicates that the withdrawal
was mainly intended to improve the timing of the application.
5.5 Selection bias
The presence of a connection in a committee leads to positive selection, probably driven
by connected researchers’ having access to better information about their chances of
success. The endogenous selection of applicants is likely to bias studies that estimate
the impact of connections using only information on actual applicants. The consistency
of such estimates requires that the set of observable controls fully accounts for any
systematic differences in the quality of connected and unconnected candidates. This
assumption is unlikely to hold in contexts where researchers can take into account the
composition of committees in their application decisions.
Next, we try to quantify the size of this selection bias. Using information on
final applicants, we compare the assessments received by connected and unconnected
researchers using an identification strategy based on observables:
yi,c = β0 + β1Connectionsi,c + Di,cβ2 + Xiβ5 + µc + εi,c, (7)
where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes value one if the candidate qual-
ifies and Xi includes all observable predetermined characteristics, including applicants’
research production.
Candidates with a connection in the committee are 6.8 p.p. (17.1%) more likely to
qualify than other final candidates with comparable observable research outputs (Table
9, column 1). Results are similar if we consider instead the total number of positive
votes received by the candidate (column 2): the presence of a coauthor or a colleague
in the committee is associated with the increase in the number of favorable votes by
0.33 (15.8%). The premium associated with connections does not vary depending on
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the research quality of candidates (columns 3-5).
As expected, the estimates provided by this ‘naive’ identification strategy based on
observables overestimate the impact of connections on candidates’ chances of success.
These estimates are 29% larger (17.1% vs. 13.3%) than the causal estimates that
exploit the random assignment of evaluators to committees (see panel B in Table 6).
5.6 Longer-term effects of connections
One of the potential advantages of not applying when failure is likely is the possibility
of applying in the following round. We investigate the overall impact of connections
on the chances of success of connected candidates taking into account both the first
and the second round of national qualification evaluations.
First, we examine the impact on applications. We estimate equation (5) using as
left-hand variable an indicator that takes value one if candidate i applied either in
the first or the second round (Table 10, panel A). On average, connections decrease
application rates over the two rounds by 1.1 p.p. This is roughly one-third of the
impact on applications in the first round, indicating that the effect of connections on
applications is mostly explained by connected candidates postponing their application
for one year.
We also examine the effect of connections on overall success rates over both evalu-
ation rounds (panel B). The positive impact of connections is larger when we also take
into account the second round. Considering both rounds, connected researchers are 6.3
p.p. (17%) more likely to qualify, compared to 4.6 p.p. (13%) in the first round. The
difference between the mid- and short-term effect is particularly large for candidates
with relatively modest research productivity (5.4 p.p. vs. 2.9 p.p.).
Finally, we analyze the impact on failure rates (panel C). The presence of a con-
nection in the committee decreases the failure rate of connected candidates by 7.3 p.p.
This effect is similar to the impact of connections on candidates’ failure rate in the
first round, and again it is larger for candidates with relatively lower research quality
(8.8 p.p. vs. 5.9 p.p.).
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For the subsample of re-applicants the role of connections seems to be mainly asso-
ciated with the existence of a positive bias and the reduction of uncertainty regarding
the evaluation standard. However, we cannot exclude that for candidates who do not
re-apply in the second round connections are associated with other dominant forces,
including the ones highlighted by the love and hate or the informed evaluator hypothe-
ses.
5.7 Promotions at the university level
A possible concern with the above analysis is that qualification in the national evalu-
ation was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to obtain a promotion. Successful
candidates have still to apply for a promotion at the university level. As a result,
there exists the possibility that the above evaluations have no real impact on actual
promotions.
We examine whether, beyond their impact at the qualification stage, connections
in the national evaluation committee have any effect on promotions at the university
level. We estimate equation (5) using as the left-hand side variable an indicator that
takes value one for pre-registered candidates who were promoted.31 A connection in
the national committee increases the promotion probability by 1.3 p.p. (10.6%) (Table
10, panel D). The effect is mainly driven by researchers with relatively low research
productivity; for this group, the connection premium is 2.1 p.p (or 38.6%). However,
the difference between these groups is not statistically significant.
We also analyze whether the above result can be explained by the difference in the
assessment of qualifications by university promotion committees depending on whether
the qualification committee included a connection. We address this issue by estimat-
ing equation (5) on the sample restricted to qualified candidates. As it is shown in
Appendix Table A4, the promotion rate of qualified candidates does not depend on
whether these candidates where promoted by a committee that included a connection.
31We use the official registry of tenured professors in universities as of December 2015 to identify
promoted candidates. We identify changes in rank either from assistant to associate professor or from
associate to full professor.
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Altogether, our results indicate that committee composition and evaluation out-
comes in the national evaluations do impose binding constraints on promotions at the
university level.
5.8 External validity
There are several threats to the external validity of our empirical estimates. Our
sample includes researchers who had pre-registered for the national evaluation. The
design of the evaluation excludes the possibility that other researchers that had not
pre-registered apply once they learn about the composition of the committee. While
we can only speculate about the size of the latter group, the available information
suggests that it cannot be substantial. As discussed in subsection 3.1, the cost of pre-
registering was relatively low, and therefore it is quite likely that most researchers who
had a positive chance of promotion (perhaps, in at least one possible realization of the
committee draw) pre-registered. In fact, the pool of pre-registered applicants accounts
for approximately 60% of researchers in Italy at the assistant and associate professor
level, presumably those who are closer to the promotion stage.
The conceptual framework presented in section 2 also suggests that the impact of
connections may differ depending on the underlying strength of evaluation biases, the
extent of information asymmetries, and the cost of applications. Our empirical results
are consistent with a context where there is a moderate connection premium in assess-
ments (either due to potential biases or due to a better observability of the quality of
connected candidates), with substantial information asymmetries and relatively small
cost of applying and failing. In this context, having access to more accurate informa-
tion about their chances of success might discourage some connected researchers from
applying. This result may not apply in contexts where there is no cost of applying
(all prospective applicants would apply) or where the cost of applying is sufficiently
large (informed researchers would be in this case more likely to apply). Similarly, if the
connection premium in evaluations is sufficiently large, the net impact of connections
on application decisions may be positive.
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6 Conclusions
We study how connections in evaluation committees affect application behavior. We
provide a simple conceptual framework which shows that the presence of a connection
in a committee may affect application decisions in a non-trivial way. Connected indi-
viduals may expect to benefit from taste or statistical discrimination at the evaluation
stage, which increases the probability that they apply. On the other hand, connected
individuals may also anticipate that they will receive a more accurate evaluation and,
moreover, they may be better informed about their chances of success. This reduction
in information asymmetries may in turn decrease the probability that they apply.
We study empirically the relevance of these channels exploiting the exceptional
evidence provided by scientific evaluations in Italy. We find that researchers are less
likely to apply when the evaluation committee includes a coauthor, a colleague or a
Ph.D. advisor. At the same time, their chances of success tend to be higher. Evidence
from a subsequent round of evaluations suggests that, by postponing their application,
weak researchers with a connection in the committee benefit also from higher success
rates in the future. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the existence of a con-
nection premium in evaluations and also with connected individuals having access to
better information which helps them to make better application decisions, in a context
where failure is moderately costly. This information advantage is particularly useful
for researchers with a weak research profile.
Our findings are relevant for the design of evaluation processes in several ways.
The design of some institutions, such as the European Research Council, which do
not disclose the identity of evaluators until the end of the evaluation process, may
help to increase the equality of opportunities. Otherwise, when prospective applicants
can observe the identity of committee members, connected individuals may take more
informed application decisions and avoid costly failures. Moreover, our analysis of
evaluations shows that, while the Italian system of national scientific qualifications
is characterized by a large degree of transparency which is aimed at increasing mer-
itocracy, connected candidates still benefit from a connection premium, although its
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magnitude seems to be much lower than in other scientific evaluations that are less
transparent.32
Finally, our analysis has also important implications for the interpretation of the
estimates of empirical studies of discrimination and evaluation biases that rely only on
information on the final set of applicants. In contexts where applications are costly,
candidates’ self-selection may lead to biased estimates. The magnitude of the bias
might be substantial. In the scientific evaluations we consider here, a naive estimation
based only on applicants’ observable information would overestimate the evaluation
bias by 29%.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the evaluation
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Note: As an illustration, the figure shows the timeline for Economics (discipline 13/A1).
Figure 2: Sample Individual Evaluation
 
The candidate PINCO PALLO has been Ricercatore universitario at the Università di PISA since 2006. His
scientific work is concerned with the development of democracy, including a monograph on the role of
public opinion in political thought and a series of contributions concerning English and Anglo-American
thought and developments from the 17th through 19th centuries, with special reference to Edmund Burke.
The candidate is a member of the "Re-Imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean, 1750-1860" project,
based at the University of Oxford. The candidate has a significant number of international conference
participations, among which those in which the English have invited him to speak about Burke are perhaps
the most indicative of a strong international reputation. In terms of specific contributions, the “silent guest”
metaphor is particularly significant in explaining how Burke plays out in the history of Italian political
thought. The candidate scores above the median on two of the three indicators of impact and has substantial
relevant teaching experience. On the basis of the application submitted, the candidate merits approval of the
request for the abilitazione scientifica.
ROMANO Andrea
Il candidato Mauro Lenci presenta una produzione composta da quattro monografie (una composta nel 1999;
una nel 2007 e due nel 2012); quattro articoli (di cui però solo uno databile al recente decennio) in riviste
varie di cui solo una qualificata del settore; tre contributi in miscellanee scientifiche prossime al settore;
l'introduzione ad un volume di M. Philp. Buona parte di tali lavori concerne principalmente argomenti
riguardanti l'opinione pubblica; la cultura politica neofascista; taluni aspetti del pensiero del Montesuieu e di
Burke. Nel complesso tale produzione del candidato risulta coerente con le tematiche proprie del settore
concorsuale. La stessa presenta altresì taluni aspetti di originalità, è ben fondata metodologicamente e ha
taluni caratteri innovativi. Complessivamente è pertanto da ritenersi buona. La collocazione editoriale è
accettabile e i vari contributi appaiono armonicamente ben distribuiti nel tempo, sia per numero che per
qualità, presentando nel periodo più recente un vuoto nel biennio 2008-2009. L’impatto dei lavori del
candidato nello specifico settore concorsuale SPS/02, Storia delle dottrine politiche, può considerarsi
apprezzabile. Lo stesso ha partecipato, anche come relatore ed organizzatore, a vari convegni del settore ed
ha tenuto e ricopre incarichi d’insegnamento nel settore proprio della Storia delle dottrine politiche (SPS/02).
Il candidato rispetta altresì gli indicatori quantitativi minimi previsti per lo specifico settore. Per quanto
attiene alla metodologia utilizzata e al rlievo dei contenuti, la produzione del candidato appare nel complesso
convincente. 
Ritengo pertanto che il candidato abbia la suffiente maturità scientifica per essere preso in considerazione ai
fini del conferimento dell’abilitazione nazionale alla seconda fascia per il settore 14/B1, specificamente per il
settore scientifico disciplinare SPS/ 02, Storia delle dottrine politiche. 
RUGGE Fabio
Il candidato, ricercatore all'Università di Pisa, ha svolto una buona attività didattica (SSD SPS/02); raggiunge
2 mediane su 3. Presenta quattro monografie (tre dal 2002, due nel 2012). Discreta sia quella sull’opinione
pubblica nella storia del pensiero politico (ETS, Pisa 2012), sia l'altra sulla cultura politica del neofascismo
italiano (Pisa University Press, 2012). Di altro e più alto livello è “Le metamorfosi dell’antilluminismo”
(Edizioni Plus, Pisa 2007). Presenta quattro contributi in volume (uno in inglese) e una introduzione in lingua
inglese, in collaborazione (2011) editi sempre da ETS. Infine tre articoli, tra i quali uno in lingua inglese su
Burke a cui Lenci dedica anche un altro articolo. Il candidato va sicuramente tenuto in considerazione
positiva per l’Abilitazione alla funzione docente di II Fascia nel SC 14 B1 e specificamente nel SSD SPS/02.
Abilitato: Si
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Note: Candidates are classified in four groups, depending on the number of dimensions where
their productivity is above the median in the corresponding category. Share of candidates in
each group is indicated below.
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Effect of connections on success
Note: The figure shows field-level estimates of the causal impact of connections in committee
on pre-registered candidates’ success (x-axis) and on their probability to apply (y-axis).
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Table 1: Summary of theoretical results
Unconnected individual Connected individual
Case 1: Evaluation bias in favor of connected candidates.
Pr(i applies) α + (1− α)(1− β) 1
Pr(i promoted) α + (1− α)(1− β) 1
E(qi|i applied) αα+(1−α)(1−β) α
E(Payoffi) α + (1− α)(1− β) 1
Case 2: Information asymmetries on the evaluator side.
Evaluation is selective: α < uh
Pr(i applies) 1− β α + (1− α)(1− β)
Pr(i promoted) 1− β α + (1− α)(1− β)
E(qi|i applied) α αα+(1−α)(1−β)
E(Payoffi) 1− β α + (1− α)(1− β)
Evaluation is not selective: α > uh
Pr(i applies) 1 α + (1− α)(1− β)
Pr(i promoted) 1 α + (1− α)(1− β)
E(qi|i applied) α αα+(1−α)(1−β)
E(Payoffi) 1 α + (1− α)(1− β)
Case 3: Information asymmetries on the candidate side.
Low application costs: 1−β
β
> C
Pr(i applies) 1 α + (1− α)(1− β)
Pr(i promoted) α + (1− α)(1− β) α + (1− α)(1− β)
E(qi|i applied) α αqH+(1−α)(1−β)qLα+(1−α)(1−β)
E(Payoffi) α + (1− α)(1− β)− (1− α)βC α + (1− α)(1− β)
High application costs: 1−β
β
< C
Pr(i applies) α α + (1− α)(1− β)
Pr(i promoted) α α + (1− α)(1− β)
E(qi|i applied) 1 αqH+(1−α)(1−β)qLα+(1−α)(1−β)
E(Payoffi) α α + (1− α)(1− β)
Notes: In Case 1 evaluators are biased in favor of connected candidates, but there no
information asymmetries. In Case 2, evaluators are (un)informed about the quality of
(un)connected candidates, but evaluators do not favor connected candidates and there is
perfect information about evaluators’ standards. In Case 3 prospective candidates are
(un)informed about the evaluation standards of (un)connected evaluators, but there are
no information asymmetries about the quality of applicants and evaluators do not favor
connections. Shaded areas indicate higher values within each row.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Eligible evaluators
1 2 3 4
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Based in Italy (N=5,876):
Female 0.20 0.40 0 1
All publications 131 104 4 957
- Articles 73 85 0 920
- Books 8 10 0 139
- Book chapters 22 26 0 455
- Conference proceedings 20 37 0 401
- Patents 0.42 2.44 0 88
- Other 7 23 0 675
Average Article Influence Score 1.18 0.73 0.1 9.65
A-journal articles 11 16 0 207
Based abroad (N=1,365):
Female 0.12 0.32 0 1
Notes: Article Influence Score is only available for STEM&Med fields and A-journal
articles is only defined for publications by professors in the social sciences and hu-
manities.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics – Applications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sample:
All Position Coauthor or colleague
FP AP Yes No
Initial set of applications (N=69,020)
Mean St.Dev. Mean Mean Mean∗ Mean∗ p-value
Individual characteristics:
Female 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.003
Age 44 8 49 43 0.05 -0.01 0.000
University affiliation 0.69 0.46 0.78 0.64 0.90 0.65 0.000
Permanent university position: 0.55 0.5 0.74 0.47 0.73 0.52 0.000
- same field 0.75 0.43 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.000
Quality indicators:
CV length (pages) 16 67 20 14 0.08 -0.02 0.000
All Publications: 64 67 89 53 0.08 -0.02 0.000
- Articles 37 51 53 30 0.07 -0.01 0.000
- Books 2 5 3 2 0.01 -0.00 0.509
- Book chapters 7 12 10 6 0.06 -0.01 0.000
- Conference proceedings 10 20 14 8 0.07 -0.01 0.000
- Patents 0.24 1.65 0.35 0.19 0.00 -0.00 0.936
- Other 7 22 8 7 -0.03 0.00 0.003
Average number of coauthors 6 18 6 6 0.01 -0.00 0.118
First-authored 0.22 0.2 0.22 0.22 -0.02 0.00 0.079
Last-authored 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.003
Average Article Influence Score 1.31 0.97 1.31 1.30 -0.01 0.00 0.469
A-journal articles 4 7 6 3 0.09 -0.01 0.000
Application order 0.5 0.29 0.5 0.5 0.46 0.51 0.000
Final set of applications (N=59,150)
Production in the previous 10 years:
Social Sciences and Humanities:
- Articles 20 17 25 18 0.16 -0.02 0.000
- A-journal articles 3 4 3 2 0.10 -0.01 0.000
- Books 2 3 3 2 0.02 -0.00 0.378
Sciences:
- Articles 37 45 46 32 0.06 -0.01 0.000
- Citations 60 102 77 52 0.05 -0.01 0.000
- H-index 11 7 13 10 0.09 -0.02 0.000
Above the median in 3 indicators 0.38 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.46 0.36 0.000
Below the median in 3 indicators 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.000
Notes: Article Influence Score is defined for publications by professors in STEM&Med fields. A-journal articles
are defined for publications by professors in the social sciences and humanities. Columns 5-6 provide information
for the subset of applicants who had a connection in the committee and the subset who did not.
∗ In columns 5-6 productivity indicators and age are normalized at the exam level. Column 7 reports the p-value
for the t-test of difference in means between the two groups.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics – Outcomes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sample:
All Position Coauthor or colleague
FP AP Yes No
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Mean Mean Mean p-value
Initial set of applications (N=69,020)
Withdraws 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.000
Fails 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.52 0.000
Qualifies 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.37 0.49 0.34 0.000
Final set of applications (N=59,150)
Qualifies 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.59 0.40 0.000
Unanimous decision 0.86 0.35 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.813
Individual evaluations (N=294,656)
Length (in words) 176 277 203 164 193 175 0.000
Positive votes 0.45 .50 0.46 0.44 0.64 0.44 0.000
Set of withdrawn applications (N=9,870)
Reapplies in 2013 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.40 0.45 0.36 0.000
Set of re-applicants in 2013 (N=3,684)
Qualifies 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.57 0.67 0.55 0.000
Notes: We observe 99.7% of individual evaluations (294,656 out of 295,666 evaluations).
Table 5: Randomization test
1 2 3 4 5
Dep. var.: Female Age Same field Other field
Application
order
Connection 0.004 0.028** 0.002 0.001 -0.001
in committee (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)







Connection -0.025 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012
in committee (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019)
Notes: OLS estimates based on the initial set of applications. All regressions
include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for the expected number
of connections in the committee (192 dummies). Dependent variables in columns
2, 5-10 are normalized at the exam level. Standard errors are clustered at the
committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and *
significance at 10%.
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Table 6: The effect of connections on first-round outcomes




ITT ITT IV IV IV IV
A. Applies in the 1st round
Connection in committee -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.009 -0.018** -0.062***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.045 0.118 0.119 0.146 0.121 0.138
Mean, no connections 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.934 0.869 0.799
Connection effect, % -3.1 -3.2 -3.4 -0.9 -2.0 -7.8
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.000
B. Qualifies in the 1st round
Connection in committee 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.308 0.308 0.336 0.274 0.255
Mean, no connections 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.547 0.387 0.149
Connection effect, % 11.3 12.0 13.3 9.5 12.7 19.1
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.087
C. Fails in the 1st round
Connection in committee -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.091***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.111 0.237 0.238 0.295 0.221 0.205
Mean, no connections 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.387 0.482 0.650
Connection effect, % -12.7 -13.2 -14.6 -15.7 -13.8 -14.0
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.047
Observations 69,020 69,020 69,020 21,443 21,800 25,777
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report results from an OLS estimation where the right-hand side variable is
the initial composition of the committee determined by the random draw. Columns 3-6 report results
from estimations where the final composition of the committee has been instrumented using its initial
composition.
In columns 4-6, researchers are classified according to their research productivity, as measured by the
total Article Influence Score in STEM&Med fields and by publications in A-journals in the social sciences
and humanities.
All regressions include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for the expected number of
connections in committee. Columns 2-6 also include a set of dummies for position and university, and
the set of individual controls listed in the upper panel of Table 3, all interacted with discipline fixed
effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) shows a p-value for a two-sided test of equality of coefficients for, respectively,
high and low quality candidates.
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Table 7: Evaluators’ individual voting
1 2 3 4 5 6
Sample: All final candidates Research productivity: Re-applicants
High Medium Low in 2nd round
Connection 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Candidate fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Evaluator fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 294,656 294,656 99,747 93,969 100,940 10,125
Number of applications 58,948 58,948 19,957 18,799 20,192 2025
Mean, no connections 0.440 0.440 0.624 0.488 0.217 0.577
Connection effect, % 9.0 8.9 4.7 8.9 21.2 5.9
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.072
Notes: OLS estimates. Each observation represents evaluator j assessment of candidate i. The dependent variable is
a dummy that takes value one if the evaluator votes in favor of the candidate. In columns 1-5, the vote is from the
first evaluation round. In column 6, the vote is from the second round, and the sample is composed of individuals
who withdrew the application in the first round and reapplied again in the second round. Evaluations in the second
round are available for 116 out of 184 fields, in which reports were published before May 2015.
In column 6, standard errors are clustered at the committee level.
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) shows a p-value for a two-sided test of equality of coefficients for, respectively, high and
low quality candidates.
Table 8: The impact of connections on 2nd round outcomes
1 2
Dependent variable: Reapplies in the 2nd round Qualifies in the 2nd round
Sample: Withdrew in the 1st round Reapplied in the 2nd round
Connection in committee 0.047*** 0.096***
(0.014) (0.025)
Observations 9,870 3,684
Adjusted R-squared 0.158 0.208
Mean, no connections 0.356 0.548
Connection effect, % 13.1 17.5
Notes: OLS estimates. All regressions include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for
the expected number of connections in committee. Individual controls include a set of dummies for
position and university, and the set of individual controls listed in the upper panel of Table 3, all
interacted with discipline fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance
at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table 9: Identification based on observables
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable: Qualifies Positive votes Qualifies
Sample: All final candidates Research productivity:
High Medium Low
Connection in committee 0.068*** 0.329*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.006) (0.028) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 59,150 59,150 20,028 18,855 20,267
Adjusted R-squared 0.422 0.451 0.380 0.374 0.381
Mean, no connections 0.399 2.082 0.586 0.446 0.186
Connection effect, % 17.1 15.8 11.5 14.6 34.8
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.882
Notes: OLS estimates. The sample is composed of all final applicants who received evaluations. All
regressions include exam fixed effects, a set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in
committee, a set of dummies for position and university, and the set of individual controls listed in the upper
panel of Table 3, all interacted with discipline fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the committee
level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) shows a p-value for a two-sided test of equality of coefficients for, respectively,
high and low quality candidates.
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Table 10: The effect of connections on two-period outcomes and promotion




A. Applies in the 1st or the 2nd round
Connection in committee -0.011*** -0.000 0.002 -0.035***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean, no connections 0.911 0.961 0.925 0.861
Connection effect, % -1.2 -0.03 0.2 -4.0
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.002
B. Qualifies in the 1st or the 2nd round
Connection in committee 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.068*** 0.054***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean, no connections 0.371 0.566 0.421 0.178
Connection effect, % 17.0 10.4 16.1 30.2
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.724
C. Fails in the 1st or the 2nd round
Connection in committee -0.073*** -0.059*** -0.066*** -0.088***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Mean, no connections 0.540 0.394 0.504 0.684
Connection effect, % -13.6 -14.9 -13.1 -12.9
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.051
D. Promoted by December 2015
Connection in committee 0.013*** 0.007 0.012 0.021***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Mean, no connections 0.121 0.203 0.123 0.056
Connection effect, % 10.6 3.6 9.7 38.6
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) 0.230
Observations 69,020 21,443 21,800 25,777
Notes: The table reports results from instrumental variables estimations where the final
composition of the committee has been instrumented using the outcome of the initial
random draw.
All regressions include exam fixed effects, a set of dummy variables for the expected
number of connections in committee, a set of dummies for position and university,
and the set of individual controls listed in the upper panel of Table 3, all interacted
with discipline fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 1%.
p-value(Z(High vs. Low)) shows a p-value for a two-sided test of equality of coefficients
for, respectively, high and low quality candidates.
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Appendix A.
Table A1: The effect of connections, by connection type
1 2 3
A. Outcomes of the 1st round
Applies Qualifies Fails
Coauthor in committee -0.021*** 0.052*** -0.073***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Colleague in committee -0.033*** 0.034*** -0.067***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Ph.D. advisor in committee -0.011 0.097*** -0.108***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
B. Outcomes of the 1st and 2nd rounds
Applies Qualifies Fails
Coauthor in committee -0.007 0.065*** -0.072***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Colleague in committee -0.014** 0.051*** -0.066***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Ph.D. advisor in committee -0.000 0.107*** -0.107***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.018)
Notes: Each coefficient is an OLS estimate from an independent regression
where the right-hand side variable is the number of initially assigned con-
nected evaluators of corresponding type (coauthors, colleagues, or advisors).
All regressions include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for the
expected number of connections in committee (180 dummies for coauthors, 88
dummies for colleagues, and 57 dummies for Ph.D. advisors).
Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
50
Table A2: Non-linear effect of connections
1 2 3
A. Outcomes of the 1st round
Applies Qualifies Fails
One connection in committee -0.030*** 0.035*** -0.065***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)




B. Outcomes of the 1st and 2nd rounds
Applies Qualifies Fails
One connection in committee -0.012*** 0.051*** -0.063***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)




Notes: OLS estimates from regressions that include indicators for candidates
who have respectively one and more than one connection assigned to the com-
mittee. All regressions include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables
for the expected number of connections in committee.
Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table A3: The effect of connections when there is only one candidate from
the institution
Applies
Connection in committee -0.058**
(0.027)
Mean, no connections 0.802
Connection effect, % -7.23
Observations 4769
Notes: The sample is composed of candidates who have no other competitors
from the same university applying for the same evaluation. The table reports
results from an IV estimation where where the final composition of the com-
mittee has been instrumented using its initial composition. All regressions
include exam fixed effects, a set of dummy variables for the expected number
of connections in committee, a set of dummies for position and university, and
the set of individual controls listed in the upper panel of Table 3, all interacted
with discipline fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance
at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table A4: Connections in the qualification committee and promotion at the
university level
Promoted by December 2015
Connection in the qualification committee 0.001
(0.007)
Mean, no connections 0.281
Connection effect, % 0.2
Observations 25342
Notes: The sample is restricted to candidates who received a qualification in the
national qualification evaluation. The table reports results from an IV estimation
where where the final composition of the committee at the qualification stage has
been instrumented using its initial composition. All regressions include exam fixed
effects, a set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in commit-
tee, a set of dummies for position and university, and the set of individual controls
listed in the upper panel of Table 3, all interacted with discipline fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at
1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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